Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424

May 3, 2006

Prepared By: Israel C. Sayao

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

Lease of a parcel land in Public domain- Doctrine of Reparian Rights

JULIAN SANTULAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. L-28021

December 15, 1977

Facts:

Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by their heirs were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of public domain with an area of about 4 ½ hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite. The Petitioner Santulan surveyed the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the application for revocable permit to occupy the said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven years later after acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand, private respondent Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was illegally entered the area covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and was refrain from introducing improvements.

However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for a revocable-permit and a lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the said land. He also contends that he had been in the continues and exclusive possession of the land since 1920 when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals, and allegedly converted two (2) hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood. On the northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. The private respondent said that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953. The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private respondent Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict.

Issue:

Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private respondent could nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights?

Ruling:

The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to “reparian rights” which may he invoked by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. It was found out that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides that is an extension of Santulan’s Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17, 301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent, and the said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action of the sea, and the petitioner was the first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon.

Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad faith, and latter’s allegation with respect to the possession and improvements could not nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights. Therefore, the rejection of the private respondent’s revocable permit and foreshore lease is proper.

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Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner � The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank of a river.

“Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.